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Abstract: The lag between the time that a borrower stops making payments 
on a mortgage and the termination of the loan plays a critical role in the costs 
borne by both borrower and lender on defaulted loans. While the prior 
literature uses a multinomial logit approach, statistical tests indicate that we 
cannot accept the associated assumption of Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA). Using a nested logit specification our results suggest that 
the recipe for delinquency involves young loans to low credit score borrowers 
with low or no documentation in housing markets with moderately volatile 
and flat or declining nominal house prices. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Subprime lending in the mortgage market has seen dramatic 
growth since the early 1990s. The share of total originations that is 
subprime has risen from 1.4% in 1994 to 18.7% in 2002. Lenders 
include both mono-line lenders (subprime only) and larger institutions 
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that provide subprime loans as part of a continuum of alternatives. 
The securitized market for subprime loans has also been growing, with 
the securitization rate of subprime home mortgages rising from 31.6% 
in 1994 to 62.5% in 2002.1 While the subprime securitization rate is 
still below the prime or conventional market rate (73.8% in 2002), it 
has helped bring the subprime market into a form more closely 
resembling the prime market (Inside Mortgage Finance, 2003). 
 
Subprime lending can most easily be characterized as high risk 
lending, especially as compared to the conventional prime sector of 
the mortgage market. To compensate for these risks, which include 
elevated rates of prepayment, delinquency and default, lenders must 
charge higher risk spreads. The understanding of these risks is of 
crucial importance to both regulators and lenders. This paper focuses 
on one of the least studied risks, the delinquency of subprime loans. 
Delinquent loans increase the costs of servicing, increase losses for 
any institution guaranteeing timely payments, and impact payments to 
subordinate tranches. Even if the loans do not terminate, elevated 
rates of delinquency will impact pricing in the primary and secondary 
markets. 
 
2. Motivation 
 
The performance of a mortgage is often characterized by 
whether the loan has prepaid or defaulted, as well as the loss on any 
outstanding defaulted balance. Empirical models of these events can 
then be used to understand the sensitivity of a mortgage to economic 
conditions, loan type, and borrower information. Estimates of these 
relationships rely on option pricing techniques that allow the borrower 
to exercise the option to put the mortgage back to the lender or 
investor through default or to call the mortgage through prepayment. 
 
Puts and calls can be motivated by financial considerations or by 
external events. A mortgage is put, at least in its simplest form, when 
the mortgage outstanding is greater than the value of the property 
after accounting for costs such as transaction fees. These are often 
referred to as “ruthless” defaults. Similarly, a mortgage is called and 
prepaid, typically due to a drop in interest rates, if the gain from doing 
so outweighs the cost. Subprime borrowers may also put a mortgage 
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when their history of paying financial obligations has improved, thus 
making lower cost credit available. Beyond the financial motivations, 
other factors, coined trigger events, have been identified as potential 
causes of loan defaults and prepayments. Typical trigger events 
include losing a job, a severe illness, or the breakup of a household. 
These unanticipated events, which can be either temporary or 
permanent, will likely change current and future income streams and 
make it difficult to continue paying a mortgage. Trigger events can 
lead to both defaults and prepayments depending on the amount of 
equity in the mortgage and expected income streams. 
 
It is important to remember that the lender and borrower 
interact once a loan becomes delinquent. It is the outcome of this 
interaction that determines what status the loan will be in (cure, more 
delinquency, or termination and type of termination). Therefore, all 
observed loan outcomes reflect a mixture of lender and borrower 
objectives. 
 
Before a loan enters foreclosure proceedings or the property 
becomes owned by the lender, there is a gray area in which a 
borrower is delinquent. While missing a single payment on a mortgage 
may violate the mortgage contract or agreement and thus could 
technically be considered a default, lenders prefer and are usually 
legally required to allow borrowers to be delinquent over a longer time 
period before pursuing foreclosure or alternative methods of collecting 
the debt. It is this time period as a loan moves from being one 
payment late, to two, and three payments late that is this paper’s focal 
point. Delinquent loans consist of a mix of temporary delinquency, 
which will eventually cure, and delinquency that is driven by the 
standard option motivation to default or prepay. 
 
The subprime mortgage market is a fertile segment of the 
market to examine delinquency because it includes borrowers who 
have already shown that they have trouble meeting their financial 
obligations. Therefore, subprime loans should exhibit high rates of 
delinquency and default. This should aid in identifying key factors that 
drive delinquency. These factors could include both time constant and 
time varying factors. For example, borrowers in ruthless delinquency 
(delinquency driven by the financial desire to default) may find that by 
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the time delinquency reaches 60 or 90+ days house prices have 
increased enough to make it no longer financially sensible to go all the 
way to foreclosure. 
 
This paper uses a large and nationally representative sample of 
data from LoanPerformance. com (formerly MIC) to examine the 
monthly status of single-family 30-year fixed-rate subprime mortgages 
from 1996 through the middle of 2003. 
 
This paper is one of the first examinations of the delinquency of 
subprime loans. It includes—(1) an examination of subprime mortgage 
performance using a large nationally representative sample of loans 
covering multiple lenders and servicers, (2) a model of multiple states 
of delinquency as well as termination states simultaneously, and (3) 
the utilization of nested logit in a hazard model framework. 
 
3. Background and literature review 
 
This paper draws from two lines of literature. The first line is the 
growing body of research on the subprime mortgage market. The 
second line focuses on the performance and modeling of mortgages 
and specifically the delinquency of mortgages. 
 
3.1. Subprime 
 
Over the last 10 years the growth in the subprime mortgage 
market, while substantial, has been uneven. The subprime market 
rapidly expanded in the mid- and early-1990s. In 1998, however, the 
marketwas hit by two events that caused a liquidity crunch (Temkin, 
Johnson,&Levy, 2002). First, subprime lenders experienced 
unexpected losses after high default, delinquency, and prepayment 
rates occurred. Second, the Russian bond crisis during late 1998 
caused investor confidence to decline. The resulting secondary market 
discipline led to a short time period of retrenchment followed by 
renewed growth in different market segments. Before 1998, growth in 
subprime came from a rapid expansion in lending to the riskiest 
portions of the market. After 1998, which was also associated with 
consolidation in the industry, growth has come in the least risky 
portions of the market. This segment is typically referred to as A- 
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lending and includes borrowers with impaired credit histories that are 
willing to pay a premium over the prime lending rate typically in 
excess of 290 basis points (Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, 2004 
and Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, 2006). 
 
In fact, subprime lenders provide a menu of mortgage options 
to borrowers with a variety of impairments. The most typical 
impairment is poor credit history. Borrowers with worse credit history 
pay higher premiums and must provide larger down payments to help 
defray some of the expected losses and expected delinquency of these 
types of loans. Another segment of the subprime market is referred to 
as Alt-A, which is short for Alternative A lending. These types of 
borrowers look just like prime borrowers in terms of credit history and 
assets to make down payments, but they usually provide limited or no 
documentation on their income or down payment. As a result, they 
typically pay a 100 basis point premium (Chomsisengphet & 
Pennington-Cross, 2004). 
 
As should be expected given the impairments of subprime 
borrowers, the Mortgage Bankers Association of America (MBA) 
reports that in the third quarter of 2002 subprime loans were 
delinquent 5½ times the rate of conventional mortgages (14.28% 
versus 2.54%). In addition, subprime loans started foreclosure more 
than 10 times more often (2.08% versus 0.20%). There is also 
evidence that subprime lending is most often used in high-risk 
locations (Calem, Gillen, & Wachter, 2004, and Pennington-Cross, 
2002). While subprime borrowers also tend to have less knowledge 
about the mortgage process, a borrower with a subprime mortgage is 
not necessarily stuck using high cost lending forever. Survey evidence 
indicates that of subprime borrowers who get another mortgage, 
39.6% successfully transition into the prime market (Courchane, 
Surette, & Zorn, 2004). 
 
The growing literature on subprime lending in the mortgage 
market consistently shows that subprime differs substantially from the 
prime market on many dimensions. The first and perhaps initially most 
curious fact regarding subprime is simply that it is segmented from the 
prime market. Theoretical models have explained this segmentation. 
Cutts and Van Order (2005) focus on the amount of underwriting a 
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lender should do in each risk classification. They find that the most 
extensive underwriting will be done on the least risky loan types. 
Nichols, Pennington-Cross, and Yezer (2005) provide a different 
segmenting equilibrium in which lenders specialize in either subprime 
or prime lending. In their model if a lender sets lending standards too 
close to the entrenched prime market, then application costs become 
so high that it becomes less costly to lower credit standards and 
accept more high-risk applicants. This result is driven by the costs 
associated with processing rejected applications. When a high 
proportion of applicants are rejected it can overwhelm any benefits 
associated with the lower risk borrowers. An optimum distance in 
credit quality space is then found, thus motivating the need for a 
segmented high-risk or subprime mortgage market. 
 
The literature on the performance of subprime mortgages has 
focused on default, prepayment, and losses on outstanding defaulted 
balances. In general, loss severity tends to be higher for high-risk 
borrowers and high-risk property. These losses tend to be larger even 
though subprime borrowers tend to put the mortgage earlier than 
prime borrowers—when it is less in the money to default 
(Capozza&Thomson, 2005). Research has also found that loans 
originated by third parties tend to default at elevated rates and that 
high cost borrowers are less responsive to changing interest rates 
(Alexander, Grimshaw, McQuen, & Slade, 2002, and Pennington-Cross, 
2003). Evidence from a single subprime lender shows that risks tend 
to be higher for the higher cost segments in the market because the 
defaults are more highly correlated. For lower cost segments, such as 
A- and Alternative-A, subprime loans showed relatively low default 
correlation rates (Cowan & Cowan, 2004). 
 
3.2. Delinquency 
 
Traditional option based mortgage-pricing research includes 
three possible states for a mortgage—(1) current or active, (2) 
prepaid, or (3) defaulted.2 This approach typically ignores the fact that 
lenders are usually legally not allowed to begin foreclosure proceedings 
until two payments are missed and the third is due. Many options are 
available to lenders besides foreclosure to recover losses on defaulted 
loans and it can take a substantial period of time to complete a 
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foreclosure. For example, the main feature of a ruthless default is that 
it makes financial sense because the mortgage is substantially larger 
than the value of the property. But, the relevant value of the property 
is at foreclosure, not when the first or even second payment is missed. 
Kau and Kim (1994) indirectly discuss this issue by showing that the 
value of a future default can impact whether an “in the money” default 
today will be exercised. For example, if house prices continue to drop 
in the future the value of default will be larger in the future, and the 
borrower will wait. In a stochastic framework, the larger the variance 
of house prices the more value there may be in the future, so it is 
consistent for borrowers that are “in the money” to default to wait. 
 
Ambrose, Buttimer, and Capone (1997) explicitly introduced into 
the option-pricing framework the delay of foreclosure and the concept 
that the decision to stop making payments is determined by expected 
values of the property well into the future (at the foreclosure date). 
The delay of foreclosure can be interpreted as an increase in the 
delinquency of the loan, but the model treats the delay of foreclosure 
as an exogenous variable and therefore, can be used to provide 
predictions about the probability of default given a foreclosure delay or 
delinquency time period. For instance, the probability that a loan 
defaults and becomes delinquent is sensitive to the delay before 
foreclosure, the loan to value (LTV) ratio at origination, and the 
variance of house prices. Specifically, longer delays (more expected 
delinquency) and higher LTVs are associated with higher default 
probabilities. The response to the variance of house prices in non-
linear. In general, as the variance increases the probability of default 
increases because the probability of negative equity has increased. 
The direction of this effect can change to negative when there is a 
very long delay until foreclosure or the lender has no recourse to 
recover any losses from other assets beyond the value of the house. 
This is a natural result, because in these circumstances there may be 
time for the house price to drop even further in the future making a 
future default more valuable and at the same time the borrower can 
receive free rent while the loan is delinquent (not paying any mortgage 
or monthly rent).3 
 
Empirical research dating back 30 years has already identified 
many of the same drivers of delinquency that have been included in 
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more recent options oriented theoretical models. For instance, using 
sparse data sets from the 1960s and early 1970s, Morton (1975) and 
Furstenberg and Green (1974) found evidence that the LTV at 
origination and income of the borrower were important determinants 
of the delinquency rates. The tenor of the results are remarkably 
similar in a more recent paper that examined delinquency rates in the 
United Kingdom (UK) using data from 1983 through 1992. Using a 
seemingly unrelated regression approach, Chinloy (1995) again 
found that LTV and income were the most important empirical 
indicators of delinquency, whether defined as 6–12 months or greater 
than 12 months delinquent. Clarifying the role of LTVs, Getter (2003) 
uses the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances to show that the best tool 
that borrowers have to avoid becoming late on a mortgage are 
financial assets, which can be used to cover financial obligations during 
unexpected periods of financial stress. To the extent that financial 
assets are correlated with down payments these results are consistent 
with earlier findings. Using an exponential hazard framework, Ambrose 
and Capone (2000) find that the probability of being 90+ days 
delinquent on FHA mortgages during the mid-1990s is sensitive to 
contemporaneous economic conditions in both the labor and housing 
markets. Similar to Ambrose and Capone (2000), using individual loan 
level data Calem and Wachter (1999) estimated the probability of 
being either 60 days or 90+ days delinquent using individual logits, 
thus implicitly assuming that the probability of being 60 and 90+ days 
are independent of each other. They find that credit scores matter for 
both delinquency categories, but LTV has no effect. Lastly, Baku and 
Smith (1998) use a case study approach to find that the performance 
of loans made by nonprofit lenders to low income households is 
sensitive to the incentive structure internal to the nonprofit agency. 
In short, the behavior of the lender does have an impact on loan 
delinquency. 
 
Industry reports have examined transition matrices of subprime 
loans. In these reports various states of delinquency are collapsed into 
more aggregate groups, all states are assumed to be independent of 
each other, the estimation procedure is not reported, and the results 
cannot be extended beyond the single lender/servicer used in the 
report (Gjaja & Wang, 2004). The results suggest that indicators have 
different impacts on the extent of delinquency. 
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This paper expands on this literature by recognizing that there 
are multiple states of delinquency and that these states are not 
independent of each other. But, in addition to the need to recognize 
the importance of various degrees of delinquency, any model must 
also recognize that loans can also prepay or default and that all these 
options are best viewed as competing risks.4 
 
4. Estimation technique 
 
Several methods are available to model empirically the possible 
outcomes of a subprime mortgage loan. We discuss two of these 
alternatives, multinomial logit and nested logit, below.  
 
4.1. Multinomial logit 
 
Multinomial logit is the standard estimator used in modeling 
outcomes with multiple possible states (>2). A drawback to the 
multinomial logit model is an undesirable property known as 
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). This implies that the 
odds ratio for any two alternatives m and n do not depend upon any 
other alternatives. A well-known example illustrates a problem with 
this assumption. A traveler has a choice of going to work by car or by 
a blue bus. Let the choice probabilities be equal, implying the ratio of 
probabilities equals one. Now introduce a choice of a red bus that the 
traveler considers equivalent to a blue bus. We would expect the 
probability of going to work by car to remain the same at 0.5, while 
the probabilities of going to work by bus would be split evenly between 
blue and red buses at 0.25. If this were true, then the ratio of 
probabilities between car and blue bus, formerly at 1, would now be 
equal to 2 (0.5 divided by 0.25). 
 
The addition of a red bus alternative changed the ratio of 
probabilities between car and blue bus. The multinomial logit model 
does not allow this possibility. The ratio of probabilities between the 
car and blue bus alternatives must remain at one. Clearly, this result 
in nonsensical, because households will just evenly split between the 
blue and red bus. Recall that there are equal probabilities of taking a 
blue bus and a red bus. The only profile of probabilities that fit these 
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two constraints puts equal probability of 0.33 on each choice. The 
multinomial logit would therefore overestimate the probability of 
taking a blue or a red bus and would underestimate the probability of 
taking a car. 
 
4.2. Nested logit 
 
An alternative modeling strategy that partly solves this problem 
is to use nested logit models. Loan outcomes are partitioned such as 
shown in Fig. 1. Each upper-level group is called a ‘branch,’ while each 
lower-level group of outcomes within a branch is called a ‘nest.’ The 
IIA property holds within nests but not between nests. For example, 
IIA holds between the choices prepay and default, but does not hold 
between prepay and any of the other outcomes such as current. This 
suggests the hypothesis that removal of an alternative from the choice 
set results in equal proportional increases in the probabilities of the 
choices within a nest, but not different proportional changes across 
different nests. For example, removal of the prepay option would 
result in an equal proportional increases in the probabilities of 30 late, 
60 late, and 90+ late, but no restrictions would be placed upon the 
increase in the probability of default and of current. 
 
Estimation of the nested logit model is by Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood (FIML). The probability of an outcome is specified 
as the product of the probability of being at a branch and the 
probability of the outcome conditional on the chosen branch. Note that 
the nested logit structure does not assume that decisions by borrowers 
are made sequentially. This is a subtle but important point. Consider 
the outcome “prepay”. The tree structure in Fig. 1 does not assume 
that mortgage holders first decide to terminate a mortgage and then 
decide whether to terminate by prepaying or by defaulting. Rather, the 
tree structure implies that the probability of prepaying is specified as 
the probability of terminating the mortgage multiplied by the 
probability of prepaying conditional on terminating the mortgage. 
 
Different formulations of the nested logit model appear in the 
literature. We use the Non-Normalized Nested Logit (NNNL) model that 
is estimated in STATA version 8.5 
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5. Data description 
 
We utilized data from LoanPerformance (LP, formerly MIC). LP 
collects data from pools of non-agency publicly placed securitized 
loans. Static information about individual loans is collected, such as 
documentation type, origination balance, and purchase price, as well 
as monthly updated information on loan status. Data on loans 
originated between January 1996 and May 2003 are included. The 
database contains information on over 1000 pools of subprime loans 
representing over 3,500,000 individual loans. For our estimations, we 
choose a random cross-section sample of 100,000 30-year fixed-rate 
loans for owner-occupied property from the LP database. After 
eliminating loans with missing data, a database of 97,852 observations 
resulted. 
 
We matched data from several external data sources to the LP 
data. First, we matched data on the quarterly change in the OFHEO 
House Price Index (HPI) and on the standard error of the HPI to the 
loan data by state. We then matched Bureau of Labor Statistics data 
on the unemployment rate lagged by 1 month by state. Finally, we 
matched data on the prime interest rates on 30-year fixed mortgages 
from the Freddie Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market Survey for the given 
month and for the origination month and computed the difference. 
Summary statistics for the data are in Table 1. 
 
The monthly delinquency rate for our sample remains fairly 
constant from June 1999 to May 2003. The 30-day delinquency rate 
stays around the average 1.4% during this time period. There is a 
slight uptrend in the 30-day delinquencies since spring 2002. The 60-
day delinquency rate is lower, with an average of 0.5%, and generally 
lags behind the 30-day delinquency rate. For example, there is a one-
half percentage point decline in the 30-day rate in April 2000, followed 
by a decline of almost a third of percentage point in the 60-day rate in 
May. The 90+-day delinquency rate closely tracks the 30-day rate and 
has an average equal to 1.1%. 
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6. Results 
 
As described above, two alternative econometric techniques are 
available to model subprime loan outcomes. Multinomial logit has been 
predominately used in the literature. Recall that multinomial logit 
makes the assumption of IIA on the alternative outcomes. To test 
whether this assumption is appropriate, we performed the Hausman 
and McFadden (1984) and Small and Hsiao (1985) tests. The results of 
the tests, shown in Table 2, strongly suggest that IIA is not a valid 
assumption for this data set. For each omitted category of dependent 
variable, the Small-Hsiao test unambiguously rejects the null 
hypothesis of IIA. The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of IIA 
for half of the omitted categories, and the negative values of the test 
statistic on two omitted categories, while suggesting that IIA is not 
violated, are difficult to interpret. In sum, we conclude that 
multinomial logit is not an appropriate estimation technique because 
the IIA assumption does not hold, and we therefore use nested logit.6 
 
Instead of presenting the nested logit coefficient estimates, 
which are extremely difficult to interpret, Table 3 presents the one 
standard deviation elasticity estimates for continuous variables and 
binary elasticity estimates for the discrete variables. Appendix A 
provides the coefficient and standard errors estimates. Appendix B 
includes sensitivity tests presented in graphical form for all exogenous 
variables. Table 3 estimates reflect the percent change in the 
probability of the event occurring, as indicated in each column, holding 
all other variables at their means. Since these impacts are not 
symmetric, elasticity estimates for both increasing the variable and 
decreasing the variable by one standard deviation are presented. Note 
that the lack of symmetry increases the larger the responsiveness. 
However, we do not know the statistical significance of the reported 
elasticities due to the highly nonlinear nature of the likelihood function. 
 
When examining the results it is important to remember that 
this paper defines default as any loan that is in the foreclosure process 
or the property has become owned by the lender. Other papers 
occasionally use 90+ days late or the date the distressed property is 
sold (as real estate owned or at a foreclosure sale) as an alternative 
definition of default. 
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6.1. Impact of credit scores 
 
The impact of credit scores is very strong and most of the 
results meet expectations. Loans with better credit scores are much 
more likely to stay current and less likely to enter delinquency or 
default. For example, the probability of 90+ delinquency falls from 
1.89% for a FICO of 579 to 0.75% with a FICO of 649. This supports 
the notion that past performance on other financial obligations is a 
strong indicator of future ability or desire to pay. 
 
In contrast with Pennington-Cross (2004) we find that 
borrowers with higher credit scores are slightly less likely to prepay. 
Fig. B1 shows an inverted U-shaped relationship. For credit scores 
below 630, the results show a positive relationship between credit 
scores and the probability of prepayment. A borrower with a FICO 
score at the mean 649 has a 2.61% probability of prepaying. A 
borrower with a FICO one standard deviation above the mean, 718, 
has a prepay probability of 2.53%. This group of loans with high credit 
scores is unique because the FICO is sufficient to qualify for a prime 
loan, yet the borrower obtained a subprime loan. These results likely 
reflect the uniqueness of the borrowers with these loans and the 
permanence of their constraining circumstances. 
 
6.2. Financial incentives 
 
Consistent with expectations, loans that are originated with 
higher LTVs are more likely to be delinquent. Serious delinquency (60 
and 90+ days) is especially sensitive to homeowner equity at 
origination. The results are not consistent with the predictions of 
Ambrose et al. (1997) that higher LTVs are associated with higher 
probabilities of default. A loan with an 80% LTV has a probability of 
default of 2.71%, while a loan with a 100% LTV has a probability of 
default of 2.39%. This seems to indicate that original LTV does not in 
itself provide a good indicator of ruthless default types, but instead the 
inability or desire to provide a down payment indicates a proclivity to 
miss payments without the intent of losing the home. It could also 
indicate that lenders are less likely to foreclose on homes without 
equity but instead allow the borrowers to remain in delinquency. 
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When house prices are increasing, borrower equity should be 
growing, making it easier to prepay and less likely to default. In the 
model, the probability of delinquency and default decreases when 
prices increase. The model shows that prepayment is fairly 
unresponsive to changes in house prices, while was an unexpected 
result. 
 
To more accurately calculate the equity of a borrower in each 
month we need to know the value of the property and the outstanding 
balance of the loan. State level house prices help to proxy for the 
house value, but there is a substantial dispersion of individual house 
prices around the mean appreciation rate through time. One way to 
measure this dispersion is to use estimates of the relationship between 
the variance of individual house price around the mean appreciation 
rate and time since the last transaction. We use this information to 
calculate what is labeled the standard error of house prices for each 
individual home in the sample. In essence, this provides an estimate of 
how confident we are that the individual house price has increased at 
the area rate. If we have little confidence then there is higher 
probability that the borrower has negative equity in the house. This 
makes it more likely that the borrower will attempt a ruthless 
default.7 
 
We do find a strong positive impact of the standard error 
estimates on the probability of default and 90+-day delinquency in 
support of this interpretation. Areas with low standard errors, or areas 
in which we have less confidence in the appreciation of the borrower’s 
specific property, are much less likely to default than in areas with 
high standard errors. In conjunction with the effects of changes in 
house price, these results indicate that variation of individual house 
price appreciation rates and local market conditions are important 
predictors of default and serious delinquency in the subprime market. 
The evidence presented so far indicates that subprime loans do 
respond to the economic and financial incentives to put the mortgage 
through default. 
 
To measure the volatility of average or typical house prices we 
include the standard deviation of the detrended OFHEO HPI in each 
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state. Kau and Kim (1994) theorized that when prices are volatile 
borrowers may wait longer to default, because the value of the option 
to default may be larger in the future. Ambrose et al. (1997) theorized 
that the result is indeterminate depending on the length of delay 
(delinquency) and the extent of recourse. The empirical evidence does 
not find support for a nonlinear relationship.8 Instead, as volatility 
increases loans are less likely to default or prepay. Delinquency is 
fairly unresponsive to the volatility measure, which is consistent with 
free rent motivations for many delinquent subprime loans. In total, 
these results provide supporting evidence that the value of delaying 
default is an important component needed to understand the behavior 
of subprime loans. 
 
Subprime loans are also responsive to changes in interest rates. 
As interest rates drop, the loan is more likely to prepay. A loan has a 
2.5% probability of prepaying if interest rates do not change, and a 
2.8% probability of prepaying as interest rates fall 100 basis points. 
This is consistent with the notion that financial considerations are a 
driver in prepayments even for the financially constrained subprime 
borrowers. 
 
6.3. Trigger events 
 
Trigger events, as proxied by last month’s state unemployment 
rate, in general do not act as expected. Higher unemployment rates 
are associated with lower delinquency probabilities. The probability of 
default is insensitive to local labor market conditions proxied by the 
state unemployment rate. In addition, worse labor market conditions 
are also associated with lower prepayment probabilities. In summary, 
future research needs to come to a more complete understanding of 
how subprime loans react differently to economic conditions and 
exogenous trigger events. 
 
6.4. Loan characteristics 
 
Prepayment penalties tend to act as designed and reduce 
prepayments. A loan with a prepayment penalty is 27.6% less likely to 
prepay. However, loans with prepayment penalties are also associated 
with higher likelihoods of delinquency (7.0% more likely to be 30 days 
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late and 2.5% more likely to be 90+ late) and default (2.6% more 
likely to default). Loans with limited documentation also are delinquent 
(87.6% more likely to be 30 days late and 87.9% more likely to be 
90+ late) and default (19.8% more likely) more frequently than full 
documentation loans. The impact for loans with no documentation is 
even larger. This implies that these types of loans are especially risky. 
We also included a baseline in the estimation. The nested results show 
a peak in defaults after the first 12 months. The model shows steady 
declines in prepayments as the loan ages. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the performance of a large national sample 
of securitized private label loans. It includes multiple lenders and 
therefore provides a broad examination of the performance of 
subprime loans. The results reinforce the notion that all loans, 
including subprime loans, respond to incentives to default and prepay 
a mortgage. In addition to default and prepayment, the delinquency 
behavior of subprime loans is examined in an econometric framework 
that captures all the potential outcomes for the loan. 
 
We find that financial incentives strongly explain subprime loan 
outcomes. Borrower credit scores are robust predictors of delinquency, 
default and prepayment and LTV at origination is positively correlated 
with delinquency. Several measures of housing market conditions 
indicate that subprime loans are strongly affected by all incentives to 
become delinquent and default on a mortgage. The change in interest 
rates affects prepayment, default, and delinquency. In addition, we 
find that loan characteristics are important determinants of loan 
outcomes. Prepayment penalties extend the duration of subprime 
loans, and documentation status is associated with higher delinquency 
status. 
 
Subprime mortgages represent an increasingly important 
segment of the securitized mortgage market. These loans are typically 
more risky than prime mortgages, and are characterized by higher 
rates of prepayment, delinquency, and default. This research seeks to 
explain the sources of the higher rates of prepayment, delinquency, 
and default of subprime mortgages. By better understanding the 
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sources of the risk, subprime lenders can implement better risk 
management policies. 
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1 Securities that include subprime loans are often referred to as Asset Backed 
Securities (ABS) instead of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS). 
2 For a summary of this line or research see Vandell (1995) and Kau and 
Keenan (1995). Typically these papers consider a loan “defaulted” 
when the mortgage is terminated through foreclosure or other adverse 
means. 
3 Another line of literature looks at the time from a default, which is typically 
defined as being 90+ days delinquent, to resolution of the mortgage. 
Resolution could include many of the available loss mitigation tools 
used by lenders such as foreclosure, curing, pre-foreclosure sale or 
short sale, or even assumption of the mortgage. While some 
theoretical work has been done most of the work focuses on empirical 
determinants of the various possible outcomes, typically using 
multinomial logit in a hazard style framework (Ambrose and Capone, 
1996, 1998; Geppert and Karels, 2001; Lambrecht, Perraudin, & 
Satchell, 2003; Lawrence and Arshadi, 1995; Phillips and Rosenblatt, 
1997; Wang, Young, & Zhou, 2002; Weagley, 1988). 
4 While default has been defined in many different ways, in the empirical 
work explained in the following sections default is defined as whenever 
the lender initiates foreclosure proceedings (the acceleration note) or 
the lender becomes the owner of the property which will be sold to 
help cover any losses associated with the default and period of 
delinquency. 
5 See Koppelman and Wen (1998) and Hunt (2000) for an explanation of the 
different formulations of the nested logit model. 
6 We estimated the multinomial logit model in addition to the nested logit 
model and found several differences in the relationships implied 
between the two. 
7 While this line of reasoning is commonly used to motivate the importance of 
equity in a home, it is only valid to the extent that lenders do not 
attempt to recover losses on defaulted loans from other assets the 
borrower may have (recourse or deficiency judgment lending). 
Ambrose et al. (1997) show in their model that when a lender has full 
recourse and fully exercises it that borrowers have no incentive to 
default. 
8 Future research needs to focus on measuring the time to default and the 
extent that redemption is actually used by lenders to see if the non-
linear relationship does exist in empirical models. 
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Fig. 1. Nested logit model of mortgage loan performance. 
 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics for variables in the database 
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a Note that the growth in house prices is calculated from loans purchased by Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac and therefore, will include very few subprime transactions. If 
housing purchased with subprime loans appreciate at a different rate than housing 
purchased with prime loans then the results may be biased. 
b See Dreiman and Pennington-Cross (2004) for a discussion of the variance and 
dispersion issues surrounding repeat sales house price indices. 
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Table 2. Hausman and Small-Hsiao tests of IIA assumption 
 
Note: The tests were performed using the mlogtest function in Stata. The Hausman 
test has 48 degrees of freedom and the Small-Hsiao test has 12 degrees of freedom. 
 
Table 3. One standard deviation elasticity estimates 
 
This table represents the percent change (not percentage points) in the probability of 
the event occurring holding all other variables at their means. The last three variables 
are indicators or dummy variables and report the percent change in the event 
occurring if the loan has a prepayment penalty relative to not having a prepayment 
penalty, or is low doc relative to full documentation, or is no doc relative to full 
documentation. 
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Appendix A. Nested logit coefficient and standard error 
estimates 
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Appendix B. Sensitivity tests 
 
Fig. B1. Credit scores (FICO). FICO = consumer credit score at origination. 
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Fig. B2. LTV at origination. LTV= loan to value ratio at origination. 
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Fig. B3. Change in house prices. Change in house prices = percent change in 
house prices since origination. 
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 60, No. 1/2 (January/February 2008): pg. 67-90. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission 
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
29 
 
 
Fig. B4. House price confidence (standard error of individual house price). 
Standard error of individual house price = diffusion estimate of individual 
house prices around the index estimate, as it relates to months since the date 
of origination. 
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Fig. B5. Stability of house prices (variance of the detrended house price 
index). Variance of the detrended house price index = variance estimated 
from the standard deviation of the difference between actual and 4-period 
moving average of house price change. 
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Fig. B6. Change in interest rates. Change in interest rates = the change in 
30-year fixed-rate interest rates from the date of origination. 
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Fig. B7. Trigger events (unemployment rate). Unemployment rate = the 
state level unemployment rate in the previous month. 
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Fig. B8. Baseline (age of loan). Age of loan = the number of months the loan 
has survived. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
